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Abstract 
 
The remarkable growth of Sardex as a local currency throughout the island of Sardinia over the past 5 
years motivated an in-depth look at its starting assumptions, design and operational principles, and socio-
economic context. The paper looks at Sardex as a social innovation start-up, a medium of exchange and 
unit of account, an online and offline mutual credit system, and a closed economic community or 
‘circuit’. The analysis relies on semi-structured in-depth interviews of circuit members and benefits from 
the reflexive point of view of one of its founders. The main findings are that trust was and continues to 
be fundamentally important for the creation and operation of the mutual credit system, and that Sardex 
encompasses and mediates both economic and social value(s). Compared to other mutual credit systems, 
in addition to its unique design features Sardex is distinguished by its federated model of expansion and 
its strong commitment to keeping a balance between the economic and social aspects. In Sardex, 
money’s fungibility is defined by market utility and social values at the same time. 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
This paper grew out of a small interdisciplinary EU project (http://compare-network.net/) whose partners 
were interested in different aspects of self-organisation. The COMPARE project was not only 
interdisciplinary, but it also brought academics and practitioners together in a few areas that share a 
“local” theme: urban development with ‘do-it-yourself’ (DYI) wireless networks, political theory with 
urban art and activism, and social and economic theory with a specific complementary currency (CC), 
the Sardex electronic business-to-business (B2B) mutual credit system. This paper is about the third of 
these topics. 
 
Sardex has been operating successfully in Sardinia since 2010. Its role in offsetting some of the negative 
effects of the 2007/08 financial crisis has attracted a great deal of attention. It was inspired by the WIR 
system,1 which was set up in Switzerland in 1934 in response to the lack of credit caused by the Great 
Depression (Studer, 1998) and follows its early design. As a mutual credit systems Sardex shares some 
similarities also with Local Exchange and Trading Systems (LETS, Croall 1997), although an important 
difference is that, like WIR, Sardex is mainly a B2B system, whereas LETS is mainly for individual 
members. 
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This paper recounts the highlights of the start-up phase of this phenomenon, provides an analysis of the 
Sardex system from the sociological and monetary theory perspectives, and proposes some reasons for 
its success. Our empirical methodology is based on three waves of semi-structured in-depth interviews of 
circuit members in different Sardinian towns (Dini et al. 2014-16).2 Due to time and space limitations, 
very little effort was spent on comparing Sardex to other examples of B2B mutual credit systems, or to 
map the wide range of CC typologies. The main objective of the paper is to offer a sociological lens 
through which to read and understand Sardex. This view should make evident that Sardex can be 
read/interpreted as a market where economic benefits are created because there are also social values in 
the project that Sardex represents. It is ‘money’ because it bears different meanings; it may be an 
example of a phenomenon that reflects, at the same time, two views of money that have always diverged 
in the literature. Sardex is essentially trust, towards the organization itself and the members of the circuit. 
 
Section 2 describes the birth of Sardex as a parallel currency that aims at balancing economic benefits 
with social values. The section describes how the idea took a concrete form, how it entered the local 
economy, and how it succeeded in becoming a network of exchange. In fact, Sardex is a living 
organizational form: it is a network in constant evolution that faces different challenges over time and 
seeks new and original solutions, as described in Section 3. Section 4 summarizes the two perspectives 
through which Sardex can be better understood and put into context. The sociological perspective 
highlights how a cultural project is essential to complementary currencies that offer a ‘vision’ – that is to 
say, an alternative socio-economic narrative of the context – to its members and their territory. The 
monetary theory discussion focuses on some specific design mechanisms that, by combining with its 
social aspects, make Sardex a unique example of complementary currency. Section 5 summarizes the 
primary points that make Sardex a successful and – possibly – replicable experience through best 
practices. Section 6 offers some conclusions. 
 
 
2. THE GENESIS: FROM AN IDEA TO A WORKING MODEL 
 
2.1 Time-Frame  
 
In 2006/7 two of the Sardex founders started researching the features of the current international 
monetary regime and observing how it had a profound effect on the local economies and societies 
throughout the so-called developed world. During this research (‘follow the money’ phase) two major, 
even if unpolished, assumptions arose through intense dialogue: 
 
1. The economic and financial system is very complex. Behind the complexity lie design 
decisions that make it unsustainable in many regards. 
2. History shows that societies have often developed positive exceptions (e.g. WIR) to the 
familiar pattern (rate of interest/growth imperative/inequality increase/affluence/decline/ 
collapse) 
 
In 2009 it became clear to the core team that something had to be done as no existing institution had any 
idea and/or interest in preparing for the economic depression that was on its way to Sardinia. As 
correctly forecast by Crenos (2014), in the years 2009-2014, credit conditions deteriorated 4 years in a 
row. Repossession rates soared, credit to SME decreased 3.5%, and non-performing loans stand at 12.6% 
of the total. Over the shorter period 2013-2014, credit to households decreased 2.2%. At the same time, 
the banking sector reduced lending for two consecutive years, cutting as much as 100b Euro previously 
lent to businesses and families (Ufficio Studi CGIA Mestre 2014). 
 
Between 2009 and 2013 Sardegna’s GDP per capita decreased from 80.3% to 77% of the national 
average. Unemployement grew from 15.5% to 17.5%, reaching 117,000 unemployed people. In 
percentage of workforce with a higher-education degree Sardegna ranks 257th out of 353 regions in 
Europe (Crenos 2014). Inequality figures are not very significant. The Gini coefficient appears to lag the 
crisis by a couple of years: it improved slighly (decreased) from 0.291 to 0.253 between 2004 and 2011, 
and then increased rapidly to 0.296 in 2012-13. The average Gini coefficient for Sardinia 2004-2013 is 
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0.281, for Italy over the same period it is 0.297,3 while for Europe-27 from 2006 to 2014 it is 0.3064. So 
Sardinia is marginally less unequal than the Italian average, and Italy marginally less unequal than the 
European average. 
 
 
2.2 Entering the Local Economy 
 
The main reason the founders chose to set up a complementary currency network, which at the time 
people in Sardinia had never heard about, was that they shared the ‘vision’ that it could have a positive 
impact on the island’s economy and that it would also be an interesting enterprise/endeavour to engage in 
– more specifically, what we are calling a cultural/political project (Section 4.1). Thus, while the 
founders had been originally alarmed and triggered into action by the international banking crisis and the 
general structural properties of the financial markets, the form their actions took was to set up a context-
specific enterprise with a strong commitment at the collective or community level. 
 
So, on the one hand, the Internet played an essential role, and still does, in facilitating the exchange of 
information and in providing the backbone of the circuit’s infrastructure. On the other hand, the culture 
of collaboration that was prevalent among the core team members was layered on a strong bond built 
through years of common struggle. For example, most team members before the foundation of 
Sardex.net had already tried to make a positive impact on Sardinian society through various social, 
cultural and political projects. Their shared history coupled with wilful determination became the 
foundation of a group effort which, at the same time, was also a big leap of faith in the Sardinian people 
who are known to be rather conservative and slow in the adoption of novelties (see Section 4.1.3). 
 
It was important for all the founding members to see whether small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs) and local businesses in Sardinia were ready to enter an additional and different market. Today, 
Sardex membership is overwhelmingly composed of SMEs, there are only a few large companies. Even 
more relevant, founders wanted to test whether SMEs were ready to choose to trust each other by paying 
and receiving through a non-state currency issued not in a prescriptive linear way but based on real 
market activity (social and economic). Rather than aiming at social change as external benefactors, the 
founding team wanted to provide a service and through it create employment opportunities for 
themselves and others. At the time Sardex was incorporated three of the founders were in their late 20s 
and one in his early 40s. All the founders are male. 
 
The decision to turn an idea into a ‘for-social-benefit’ service provider (‘social innovation start-up’) was 
not an easy one. It came after reviewing all possible legal entity forms permissible in Italy and the related 
pros and cons. The choice of providing a service with added value requires economic viability, 
sustainability and compliance with existing legal frameworks. Therefore, being a service provider in a 
professional way and choosing to incorporate as a limited (Ltd, s.r.l. in Italian) company was the only 
way possible to kick-start operations and to build the network from the ground.  
 
Sardex.net is built on the social relations of the founding team and their shared vision. The founders all 
had more than one strong relation with each other: from kinship, to childhood friendship, to having 
worked together on business or political efforts, to the fact that they were all from the same hometown 
(Serramanna). None had a background in economics or computer science, or had any training in finance, 
which, in retrospective, it is believed to have helped the team be creative in the research and initial 
implementation phases. Only one of the four core team members had any previous experience in running 
a business (advertising and marketing consultancy), so the commitment to learn was higher than the 
skills readily available and the emergency situation (i.e. the onset of the economic crisis following the 
financial crisis) just added a sense of reality to the endeavour ahead. In a nut-shell, C3 stands for Circuito 
di Credito Commerciale, Sardex is the name of circuit, Sardex.net is the name of the url, Sardex (SRD) is 
the unit of account, and Sardex S.p.A. is the company that runs the credit-clearing service. 
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3. THE 4 EARLY PHASES OF SARDEX (2009-2015) 
 
The development and establishment of Sardex can be subdivided into four stages, during each of which 
different insights were gleaned, structural decisions were made, and results were obtained. In this section 
we summarize these points in tabular form. First, however, we provide for the sake of clarity a very brief 
high-level description of Sardex as a mutual credit system. 
 
Sardex is a complementary currency that is used alongside the Euro and provides a zero-interest credit 
buffer for the participating SMEs. Its complementary nature suggests that it can support profit-oriented 
market activity while, at the same time, providing resilience to the system in times of capitalist crises 
through its ability to protect the weaker members of the local economy. Sardex is also the name of the 
Sardex credits as a unit of account (1 Sardex = 1 Euro), the company that provides the credit-clearing 
service (Sardex SpA), the economic circle or ‘circuit’ (Zelizer 2005; Sartori and Dini 2016), and the 
online environment (http://sardex.net/blog). The main service Sardex SpA offers is (electronic) credit-
clearing; however, it also offers the help of brokers who help supply and demand meet within the circuit, 
as explained further below, as well as other marketing aids such as a newsletter, online search, and an 
online space where companies can advertise themselves. 
 
Sardex can only be “spent” and “earned” through economic participation in the network. It is a digital 
(electronic) currency; it does not have a physical embodiment in paper notes. The emphasis in the 
previous sentence refers to the peculiar manner in which these operations are carried out in mutual credit 
systems, since Sardex credits can be created (if the buyer has a zero or negative balance) or destroyed (if 
the seller has a negative balance) at the time of the transaction. In all other cases Sardex credits move 
between accounts like ‘regular’ money. As with WIR, in Sardex transactions involve a positive entry in 
the centralised electronic ledger (in the seller’s account) that balances the equal and opposite negative 
entry (in the buyer’s account) according to double-entry book-keeping. The absence of interest motivates 
the holders of positive balances to spend them, stimulating the local economy. The absence of interest on 
negative balances, on the other hand, means that there is no penalty during negative cashflow 
fluctuations, i.e. when the buying party is in need of credit, which is particularly relevant since the core 
of the membership is constituted by SMEs. The maximum amount of credit a given company is granted 
depends on vetted indicators such as that company’s history, turnover, etc. 
 
 
Phase 1 
Time 
 
2009-2010 
Tagline 
 
Rete Sarda di Scambio 
Commerciale (Sardinian Exchange 
Network) 
Main Motivation 
 
‘Do something’ and be the best at 
enabling new economic activity 
Organization 
 
15 people 
 
Reflections 
This was the hardest time since the ‘cultural project’ with all its ideas and assumptions had to 
be tested against real market conditions. The most precious first feedback came from the 
market, i.e. from the SMEs. For instance: 
 
• ‘You’re all too young for me to take this currency thing seriously’ 
• ‘I don’t believe in the Internet’ 
• ‘The project is wonderful, yet you are too small / too big for it’ 
• ‘Is it really, truly, legal?’ 
 
Initial evaluations regarding adoption and acceptance proved that the founders were right in 
being highly conservative in their expectations of success. Yet, being mostly composed of 
first-time entrepreneurs, the team asked a traditional business consultancy before starting up. 
By altering the original operational and business plan with overly optimistic projections and 
costs and miscalculating the repercussions of the on-going financial systemic crisis, the 
consultancy ended up posing a serious threat to the very existence of Sardex.net. Luckily the 
team changed strategy in early 2010 and this led to a restart with a smaller yet more 
committed team in June 2010. 
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Focus 
Listening and understanding SME needs, their dire straits, and their strengths. The 
communication focused on social aspects in addition to the economic benefits accruable from 
participating in the network. 
 
Trials, errors and 
lessons learnt 
During this time different pricing combinations for the participating SMEs were tested, going 
from free subscription plus high-transaction fees (terrible results) to monthly fees and lower 
transaction fees (moderately positive results, but extremely difficult to collect). In mid-2010 
it was realized that all members needed to be ‘educated’ and taken care of until they were 
confident enough to operate on their own. At this time it was decided to host the first meeting 
where the network attracted around 30 between actual and prospective participants. Most of 
the early members were close to the founders in that they knew either some or all of the team 
members personally. It became clear that in order for the initiative to gain a foothold on the 
island all team members could not rely on the Internet or word-of-mouth alone to increase the 
number of participants. So the whole core team actively and consciously decided to move 
forward by taking a more traditional approach and started to visit local businesses in person.  
 
Tools 
• Online: 
 Website; Internal B2B portal; Cards; Credit lines  
• Offline: 
 Paper receipts for card transactions; Networking events; Broker visits 
 
Design Principles 
1.1- Standard transaction fee-based model (like the WIR and existing barter companies). 
1.2- If you cannot update or modify software, you can improve market share and adoption by 
focusing on customer care. 
1.3- Each member was allowed an initial credit line based on size and turnover. 
 
 
Phase 2 
Time 
 
2010-2011 
Tagline 
 
Soluzioni per l’economia 
locale (Solutions for the 
local economy) 
Main Motivation 
 
‘Do something’ and be the best at enabling 
new economic activity. Prove it can be done 
in a sustainable way even in an 
economically distressed area 
Organization 
 
7-10 people 
 
Reflections 
Working to reach a critical mass (estimated at 500 members, all SMEs at this point). All 
initial ideas tested in Phase 1 were now subject to scrutiny, especially regarding the product 
offering and pricing. Initially the value of service was not properly priced (it was based on a 
mix of transaction fees, joining and monthly service fees), this was changed and later 
modelled on company indicators (size, number of employees, turnover, etc). All actions were 
aimed at finding a new identity which could include both the social as well as the economic 
layers composing Sardex.net, since existing models did not apply nor fit because were either 
too socially-oriented or too business-oriented.  
 
Focus On reaching a critical mass of 500 SME members. 
 
Trials, errors and 
lessons learnt 
By mid-2011 the perception that all members needed ‘hand-holding’ until they were 
confident enough to operate on their own was still relevant. The key observation that led to 
the ability to address this issue was the fact that the e-commerce platform, which was 
supposed to facilitate participants’ trading, only generated very few transactions. The main 
objective was to stimulate trade and educate participants. So it was decided that to increase 
confidence all members needed to: 
 
a. be promoted inside the network through online search and advertising, as mentioned 
above 
b. be followed by a broker as if she/he were an extra sale/purchase manager 
c. receive and make quotation offers to each other about the price of products and services 
for sale. 
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The company focused on improving the service and the work of the team of CTA 
(community trade advisors, or brokers) on the ground by simplifying the message without 
diluting the values, while still looking for the right balance between economic benefits and 
social values. 
 
Tools • Same as Phase 1 
 
Design Principles 
2.1- The standard is not enough: innovation is urgently needed in software and overall 
platform model  
2.2- Principle 1.2 still applies. 
 
 
Phase 3 
Time 
 
2011-2012 
Tagline 
 
Circuito di Credito 
Commerciale: 
(Commercial Credit 
Circuit) 
Main Motivation 
 
‘Do something’ and be the best at enabling 
new economic activity. Prove it can be done 
in a sustainable way even in an economically 
distressed area 
Organization 
 
Over 15 people 
 
Reflections 
Reached first minimum critical mass and initial recognition by national press after having 
entered into a business deal. In mid-2011 one of the members (an event organizer) mentioned 
the Sardex story to a venture capital advisor and partner from dPixel who was then so 
captivated that he came to Serramanna to meet the team. After 6 months of discussions 
around contract terms and rights, by the end of 2011 an investment was agreed. A total of 
150k € were invested in developing the network infrastructure. 
 
In January 2012 Sardex.net was featured in La Repubblica Newspaper (La Repubblica 2012) 
as a prime example of a new economic model and was also portrayed for the first time as a 
start-up, a less-than-4-year-old enterprise with innovative, creative, and intellectual capital. 
Both these factors were decisive for the expansion of Sardex.net since they both attracted 
major interest. The ideas and concept coupled with, at that time, 3 years of solid growth in the 
number of circuit members (mainly SMEs) and the volume of credits transacted slowly began 
to attract a broader audience and gain social acceptance.  
 
In this period the number of pricing options (i.e. not the fees themselves) started to shrink 
(from over 20 to 5) simplifying the onboarding/introduction to prospective members. Since 
complete freedom was not achievable, there was a major push towards changing software 
platform. 
 
Heavy work took place on the ICT side as well as on communication and dissemination 
(magazine, events) and commercial developments (new partnerships being formed). New 
software for the institutional site, accounting and payment system, and internally custom-
developed tools like vSales 1.0 were implemented, all resulting in improving market access 
and market liquidity and activity. 
 
By the end of 2012 interest came also from the Regional Government of Sardinia. From that 
point, major discussions took place and led to a formal collaboration within the scope of the 
European Project DigiPay4Growth, currently active. 
 
Focus On reaching a mass of 1000 or more SME members. 
 
Trials, errors and 
lessons learnt 
In mid-2012 the founders realized that fees on transactions can create “friction”, meaning and 
impediment to trade, and may prevent meaningful and often mutually convenient transactions 
from being made. Thus, it was decided to eliminate transaction fees as this would strengthen 
a message of empowerment towards the members. The message was also explicitly made by 
pointing out that it is their coordinated effort that makes the network valuable. In other 
words, as the transaction fees seemed to exacerbate perceptions of competition between 
members, these actions shifted the emphasis towards cooperation. Yet, if self-interest remains 
the culturally dominant attitude, the main reason for failure is not a question of quality of 
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service but a matter of culture. 
 
Tools • Same as Phase 1 
 
Design Principles 3.1- Principle 2.1 still applies. 3.2- Principle 1.2 still applies. 
 
 
Phase 4 
Time 
 
2013-2015 
Tagline 
 
Circuito di Credito 
Commerciale (C3)  
(Commercial Credit 
Circuit) 
Main Motivation 
 
‘Do something’ and be the best at enabling 
new economic activity. Prove it can be done 
in a sustainable way even in an economically 
distressed area 
Organization 
 
Complex and 
diversified 
 
Further 
objectives and 
motivations 
Employees are being included in the network (give them access to the currency) to: 
 
• give them additional purchasing power  
• stimulate local consumption to render the network interesting for larger companies with 
many employees 
• motivate an increase in retail presence 
• try and establish a framework of cooperation between labour force and entrepreneurs 
 
New motivation: Try to institutionalize a practice without reducing its power and inherent 
dynamic nature. Major interest came from outside Sardinia. Especially after 2012, Sardex.net 
has been contacted by countless organizations, people, groups of people of any nature. 
Among all of these groups there were some people from mainland Italy who had an 
understanding of the model and appeared to have the capability to bootstrap a network 
bottom-up in response to the national on-going deepening economic depression. These 
became prospective partners in the new networks created on the Sardex model that started 
springing up in other regions of Italy. 
  
Organization 
Over 20 people in Sardinia / 7 network start-ups outside of Sardinia, each employing 5 to 10 
people on average: 
• Lazio tibex.net, 
• Piemonte piemex.net 
• Abruzzo CircuitoAbrex.net 
• Marche CircuitoMarchex.net 
• Sannio CircuitoSamex.net 
• EmiliaRomagna CircuitoLiberex.net 
  
Reflections 
In Sardinia: 
Sardex.net reached a strong and loyal customer base while first testing and then 
implementing the inclusion of employees in the circuit (individuals can now hold Sardex 
credits if their salary or a part thereof is paid in Sardex).  
 
Intense work on the ICT side as well as on communication and dissemination (magazine, 
events) and commercial developments (new partnerships being formed). 
 
New and open source account and payment system and internal tools like vSales 2.0 get 
implemented, all resulting in improved market access and market liquidity and activity. 
 
In other Italian regions: 
Replication 1-to-1 is impossible. Managing the dissemination of knowledge without losing 
market position and/or integrity is really difficult. Indeed, life trajectories, the right 
combination of skills, teamwork ability, and goodwill all come in different proportions and 
are extremely difficult to measure while also being essential to lead to a stable network. The 
most difficult part turned out to be and somehow still is the underestimation of the amount of 
relational/social/educational effort needed to promote a complementary currency network 
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from scratch. 
 
Other circuits made two major underestimations. It was often assumed that if such a young 
local team (founders have an average age of 30) succeeded, the expertise/workload must have 
been feasible without much effort (and therefore possible, for example, in addition to another 
job). This appears to reflect the prejudice that young people lack in experience, commitment, 
and ability to deliver. The second major misunderstanding lies in the perception that the 
driving force behind the trading activity generated inside the Sardinian network is the IT 
infrastructure. 
 
 
Focus On reaching a mass of 2000 or more members. 
 
Trials, errors and 
lessons learnt 
B2E (business-to-employee) adoption and use. 
 
Tools 
• New website 
• New Internal B2B/B2E portal 
• Cards B2B / B2E  
• Phasing out the paper receipts for transactions 
• Variable Credit lines (only when needed) 
• Intertrading among networks: Alpha test being carried out to verify if and how trading of 
surpluses among regional networks can be used to further balance and strengthen 
regional economic activity. 
 
Design Principles 
4.1- Learn / unlearn / relearn as a mantra 
4.2- If you cannot modify the core of the software you need to use, remember that you can 
bend it or hack it: there is always room to test its limits and see if they fit given 
requirement. 
4.3- All networks (even those designed in the same way) originate differently and grow 
differently, just like plants, in part in response to the effects of the main economic trends. 
4.4- The only safe credit is a credit that isn’t granted. In any credit system, no matter how 
regulated or supervised, there is a portion of risk, which is directly embedded in the 
relational nature between creditor and debtor (be they a group or a single entity). By 
removing interest from the economic model (setting the rate of interest = 0 on all positive 
and negative credit balances) the core team tried to reduce this tension. Yet, they 
remained aware that the risk of defaults and non-compliance cannot be entirely removed 
in a mutual credit system, just as they cannot be removed in the traditional economic 
system. 
 
 
Table 1 summarizes the circuit data since 2010. 
 
 
 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Members 237 439 852 1,457 2,153 2,978 
Transaction 
volume €354k €1.2m €3.5m €14.9m €30.8m €51.2m 
N. of 
transactions 402 1,195 4,556 24,991 57,773 109,410 
 
Table 1: Data on transaction volume and business membership 
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4. TWO PERSPECTIVES ON SARDEX 
 
4.1 Sardex from the Sociological Perspective 
 
Having sketched the different phases of Sardex’s birth and evolution, we now look at Sardex as a local 
institution that mediates different actors’ needs and that resembles some of the functions of the State. A 
more in-depth sociological analysis, including social value, is presented with empirical evidence in a 
separate study (Sartori and Dini 2016). The combination of several concepts from the sociology of 
money and credit within an economic sociology perspective captures the winning idea of Sardex as a 
combination of trading at the local level and a cultural project with a vision. Here, we address three main 
points: market, money, and trust. A more anthropological perspective can be found in Dini et al. (2016). 
 
4.1.1 Sardex as market 
Sardex is a local currency designed – among other things – to meet firms’ need to trade in a low-trust 
socio-economic environment and to create a self-sustaining financial system. As such, Sardex is a novel 
economic space (mostly) equivalent to a proper market. Yet, we address that proposition within an 
economic sociology framework that has tried – over the past 30 years – to address the main shortcomings 
of the neoclassical economic model, such as the atomistic conception of economic action (White 1981; 
Granovetter 1985), by discovering and highlighting useful concepts such as the importance of relational 
networks to economic action; the variety of market structures; the autonomous role of cultural and 
cognitive factors; and the constitutive role of the State in setting the rules. 
 
Within this framework, we refer to Neil Fligstein’s definition of market as a social situation where there 
are property rights, governance structures, conceptions of control, and rules of exchange (1996). The 
institutional and cultural requirements are central to our analysis. As other social processes, markets lead 
to the emergence of institutions by engaging actors through specific rules and mechanisms. If we think 
via the ‘market as politics’ metaphor, it is possible to imagine market institutions as ‘a cultural project in 
several ways’ (Fligstein 1996, 657), where actors interact through economic and social values combined 
with specific political cultures. 
 
Compared to other typologies of local and complementary currencies (such as LETS and Time Banks), 
Sardex is designed to support B2B interactions.5 In addition, Sardex is not only the organiser of a market 
and a mediator between firms, but the founders are explicitly a part of the economic value-creation 
process. They are not just a group of advocates or activists with partisan ideas about complementary 
networks. The founders make possible an environment where arrangements and societal solutions to 
problems (such as property rights, governance structures, and rules of exchange) are solved through 
experimentation following a more general ‘cultural project’ that is ultimately based on trade. Hence, 
Sardex emerges and is perceived as an institution that plays the role of a laboratory for multi-level 
governance (Sartori and Dini 2016). 
 
4.1.2 Sardex as money 
Although the state has always tried to impose a ‘standardized national currency’, controlling for state-
issued money and outlawing private coinage and counterfeit monies (Zelizer 1999), people have 
continued to try to differentiate their use of money and to create multiple forms of money. One example 
of differentiation is the emergence of local currencies as territorially bounded monetary systems that 
coexist with the national currency, when the latter fails to meet some local needs. Local currencies are 
not equivalent to national money not only because they are narrower in scope but because they 
incorporate values in the exchange. They especially express a belief in the ability of local social values to 
sustain economic exchanges. Sardex is no exception.  
 
In the sociology of money, there are two competing streams of literature (Evans 2009). On the one hand, 
the ‘money changes values’ perspective interprets money as a neutral generalized tool that all will 
destroy, objectify and commodify (Marx, Simmel, Polanyi), leaving out all social meanings people share 
and attach to money. On the other hand, the ‘values change money’ perspective (Zelizer, but also 
Veblen, Bourdieu) sees money as expressing social values. It is a function of social complexity where 
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heterogeneity of social relations leads to new and multiple forms of money that express different social 
values. In the first perspective, market utility defines money’s fungibility, i.e. the ability of money to be 
substituted for other forms of value. In the latter social values do. 
 
Sardex does not entirely fall in either perspective. It is not a colorless medium for economic exchange à 
la Simmel, that is to say, a mere quantifier of values. Also, it is more than just laden with values à la 
Zelizer. Sardex seems to have found the right compromise between economic benefits and social values 
that characterizes the ability of a local currency not only to emerge and survive, but also to compete and 
scale up. One explanation is that money is a ‘social relation between credits and debts’ as throughoutly 
stated and demonstrated (Ingham 2004; Amato and Fantacci 2012). 
 
We can draw a parallel between a local currency system and a social movement, following a resource 
mobilization theory approach (McCarthy and Zald 1977; Tarrow 2011). As for the latter, empirical 
findings suggest that a resource-rich social movement is more successful than those led by the more 
economically marginalized (Collom 2005). The same holds for local currency systems that cannot rely 
on voluntary involvement and actors too marginal to the economic environment. At the same time, 
economic benefits alone are not a guarantee for success because participation needs to be fuelled by 
social values (which are the main reason why local currencies are created when the national system fails 
to meet local demands). Sardex found the right balance for success choosing specific design mechanisms 
and tools that generated and maintained a form of participation fuelled by social values, in addition to 
economic benefits. 
 
4.1.3 Sardex as trust 
Trust is a fundamental feature of Sardex. It is community-specific and it relies on values and reciprocal 
expectations. In the case of money, trust is built around actors’ beliefs about how money is used by 
others within a specific system. Trust could work at two levels: as a starting point to join the network and 
towards the Sardex organization (direct), and as a transactions’ lubricant between members (indirect).  
 
Traditionally, Sardinia has a reputation for solitary individualistic attitudes (Lodde 1998) and, at the 
same time, for very close-knit family networks that do not facilitate and foster generalized trust (Pinna 
1971). The experience of Sardex (both in the words of the founders and the members) is remarkable in 
part because reveals that it broke a widespread attitude of scepticism towards innovations since everyone 
deems the others to be reluctant to collaboration, sceptical of social relations or even champions of 
diffidence towards market laws (search for new businesses or new partners). In terms of relational social 
capital (Coleman 1990; Granovetter 1985), we could state that both strong and weak social ties mediate 
and support innovation actions such as joining the network and trade with others.  
 
Once members are educated, the recognized value of ‘networking’ reinforces itself in a positive loop. For 
example, it happens when they realize that one of the design mechanisms wants to incentivize spending 
(not saving) the money, since there is no interest on positive balances (See Section 4.2). In this way, 
Sardex helps in establishing relations of trust needed for trading with unknown actors and it becomes – at 
the same time – a trustworthy organization that helps face transactions costs and market uncertainty, 
supplying new economic transactions with trust (Uzzi 1996). Trust in the Sardex operational team comes 
also out of solved problems, kindness demonstrated in fielding all questions, assistance provided to 
community members, and the suggestion of timely competitive ideas. As a result of all phases that 
Sardex experienced, it appears as an integrated network of economic and social ties where a good 
balance of self-interested and cooperative actions has been reached, making the cultural and social 
embeddedness of economic action clear.  
 
In sum, Sardex’s self-assigned figure of mediator (not in the sense of a broker between two circuit 
members but more generally as the credit-clearing service for the circuit as a whole) balances out those 
negative characteristics that caused other local currencies to fail: decreasing enthusiasm by the 
participants – main cause of LETS’ (Croall 1997) and Time Banks’ failures; being shut down by state or 
regulatory intervention; and absence or poor replacement in the administrative staff and leadership – as 
for the Argentinian case Treuque, Gomez 2013. In addition to the previous paragraph, we can argue that 
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the main difference between Sardex and other complementary local currencies is the role of the core 
team/service company as a mediator. By being a mediator and having chosen a precise role in the 
network, Sardex can be open to interaction with regulatory or political powers coming from the top. By 
being a service company, Sardex doesn’t suffer from decreasing enthusiasm/voluntary action by 
participants and can support the network even if one of the core team members leaves or cannot continue 
working. For a more detailed analysis of the empirical material gathered through the fieldwork, see 
Sartori and Dini (2016). 
 
 
4.2. Sardex from the Monetary Theory Perspective 
 
A more thorough discussion of Sardex from a monetary theory point of view can be found in Dini and 
Kioupkiolis (forthcoming). Here, we include only a brief summary of some points about its design 
mechanisms: Sardex is a mutual credit system, it has zero interest rate, and it requires tax transparency. 
 
Kennedy, Lietaer, and Rogers (2012) divide regional currencies according to two principal variables: 
their main purpose (i.e., to support the local community or to strengthen the community) and their core 
mechanism (circulating currency or mutual credit). Sardex is a mutual credit system, as already stated, 
and has both objectives. However, the first, economic, objective is more explicit, and the 
cultural/political project is largely seen as an enabler and an important part of the first, rather than a 
separate goal. 
 
In a mutual credit system when a purchase is effected the buyer subtracts the cost from their balance, and 
the seller adds it, just like with normal money. What’s different is that if the buyer’s balance is less than 
the cost amount it will simply go negative. Furthermore, all balances start out at zero, so that at any time 
the sum-total of all member accounts remains zero. The prototypical transaction that is generally used as 
an example, in fact, involves a buyer and a seller both of whose balances are at zero. The buyer’s balance 
will go negative by the cost of the item or service being purchased, while the seller’s will go positive by 
the same amount. Under these conditions it is clear that the mutual credit mechanism can create money 
at the time of the transaction. If both balances are positive no money is created, the cost amount is simply 
transferred from the buyer’s account to the seller’s account. If the buyer’s balance is positive and the 
seller’s negative, on the other hand, an amount of money corresponding to the cost of the product or 
service is destroyed. 
 
The amount one can go negative is not arbitrary, it is tightly controlled and depends on the size and 
turnover of the company; for the sake of this discussion it can be assumed 1% of a company’s turnover. 
Also, it is open to renegotiation every year when the membership contract is up for renewal. The 
maximum positive balance is also negotiated and is also dependent on company size and turnover. For 
the sake of this explanation it can be assumed 10% of a company’s turnover. The sum-total of all the 
positive balances is the value of all the products and services that are expected to be produced in one year 
in the circuit; that is, it constitutes the backing of the currency. In 2015 it was approximately 80m Euro. 
Although the average ratio of maximum positive balance to maximum negative balance (i.e. credit line) 
is about 10/1, the money mass actually created is about half that, for a ratio of backing to money created 
of 20/1.6 This is the opposite of what happens with ‘leverage’ in speculative financial bubbles, meaning 
that Sardex is extremely stable. and resistant to free-riding behaviour. For example, a member that 
accumulates the maximum allowed negative balance and “disappears” or goes bankrupty does not 
constitute a threat to the circuit as a whole. 
 
This mechanism of mutual credit highlights the nature of money as a relation of credit and debt (Ingham 
2004). However, the credit and the debt are not bilateral, each is towards the circuit. In Simmel’s 
terminology, whereas a credit is a claim by the member upon the circuit similar to regular money (‘claim 
upon society’, Simmel 2004: 190), a debt is a claim of the circuit upon the individual member: the 
member is expected to sell products and/or services to the circuit to recover the debt. In Sardex all 
balances carry zero interest, and the period within which a negative balance must be recovered is 12 
months, after which the amount must be returned in Euro. After a negative balance has been recovered, 
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by continuing to accept credits and going positive a member continues to contribute to the circuit. 
However, holding a large positive balance is as bad as holding a large negative: for the health of the 
circuit it is best if each member goes through zero as often as possible. 
 
Sardex as a unit of account equals the Euro. In Lietaer’s (2001) terminology, the Euro is the unit of 
account whereas Sardex is the medium of exchange. However, unlike the well-known case of Brixton 
Pound, Bitcoin, and many others, Sardex credits are not convertible into Euros, they can only be spent 
locally. The absence of interest motivates the holders of positive balances to spend them, stimulating the 
local economy. The absence of interest on negative balances also means that there is no penalty during a 
company’s negative cash flow fluctuations, i.e. when the buying party is in need of credit. This is 
particularly relevant especially during a crisis since, like for WIR, the core of the membership is 
constituted by SMEs. 
 
The absence of interest means that Sardex as a currency is not itself a commodity, leading to the 
perception that mutual credit systems are a form of barter; in fact, WIR and Sardex are sometimes 
characterised as multilateral barter systems. However, based on the textbook definition of money as 
performing the three functions of unit of account, means of exchange, and store of value (Ingham 2004: 
3), Sardex is able to perform all three and is therefore a type of money. To be sure, its perception as a 
store of value is weaker than “regular” money’s due to the absence of interest, but its ability to store and 
transfer value across time is the same.  
 
Ingham also discusses a fourth function, means of payment or settlement, which is mainly associated 
with the payment of taxes. According to the state theory of money (Knapp 1973[1924]), money derives 
its legitimacy from the authority of the State: more succinctly if perhaps reductively stated, money is that 
which the State exacts as tax. On that basis, Ingham (2004) argues that community currencies are not 
‘real’ money since they tend to emerge when the state-sponsored money is not able to perform the 
functions that the community in question needs.  Argentina after 2001 is a good example of the 
government’s inability to exact taxes in Pesos. As explained by Ingham (2004), Argentina’s consequent 
inability to service the interest and the principal on its foreign debt led to its default. Differently from 
WIR and Sardex, most of the community currencies that emerged to fill the vacuum left by the Peso 
were not taxable and did not have the State’s backing. This is one of the reasons for their demise (Gomez 
and Dini forthcoming). 
  
By contrast, not only is Sardex a medium of market exchange, but each transaction can involve both 
credits and Euros. The first 1000 Euros of any transaction must be paid entirely in credits, whereas the 
amount above 1000 can be paid partly in Euros and partly in credits. The percentage (usually 25%, 50%, 
75% or 100%) is one of the parameters negotiated with the seller when they sign the membership 
contract. However, VAT is paid on the whole amount, in Euros. As Sardex transactions are electronic 
and centrally-mediated, 100% tax transparency is guaranteed, by contract. Thus, although Sardex is not 
itself a ‘means of tax payment’, Sardex transactions indirectly contribute to the State’s fiscal revenues – 
and to positive GDP accounting due to transactions that would not have taken place without the credits 
(as does WIR, Studer 1998). The former of these two effects strengthens its legitimacy as a currency.  
 
 
5. WHY SARDEX SUCCEEDED 
 
There are many useful books and online resources trying to analyse the different dimensions of the 
design and deployment of a local currency. However, success stories like Sardex are very rare and they 
all look so different that any effort to provide “best practices” from existing efforts seems futile.  
Nevertheless, some relevant elements can be identified. Like many other experiences in the family of 
“People’s Money” (Kennedy et al. 2012), Sardex provokes a strong and widespread enthusiasm when is 
first encountered (and of course among its members), while an awareness of how difficult it is to start 
such a project and reach sustainability is lacking or strongly underestimated. 
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From a practitioner’s perspective, the success of a complementary currency can be defined in the most 
utilitaristic way as a sustained growth in the number of members and a low and decreasing percentage of 
member dropout, since this implies a sustainable level of satisfaction. Success, however, also involves 
intangibles such as community identity, social ties, high trust levels, and solidarity between the members. 
Finally, success can also be found in the level of replicability of a given model in different contexts. 
Even if not every year in the same way and not uniformly across the circuit, Sardex has so far achieved 
these mesaures of success to a significant degree. This can be ascribed to several innovative strategies 
and organisational/institutional features, the main ones being (not in order of importance): 
 
• Educating users about how to use the network and what the network aims to achieve is a never-ending task. 
• Sardex has developed a very sophisticated active brokering methodology that supports the economic activity 
by connecting supply and demand, but also builds trust since the brokers do not get any commission from 
successful matches. 
• The adoption of a “conservative” credit line strategy protects the circuit from free-riding behaviour and makes 
speculative bubbles impossible: the backing is always many times (approximately 20) the circulating 
currency. 
• The commitment of the members to accept up to a maximum number of credits (roughly 10 times the credit 
line) cements a certain level of commitment to the network. 
• By collaborating actively with academics from multiple disciplines Sardex remains open to fresh ideas and 
contributes to the academic research community. This is related also to an increasing interest in educational 
programmes, as well as professional communication and marketing campaigns. 
• Non-convertibility to/from national fiat currency is a strength, not a limitation. It helps the local economy 
withstand the strong credit shocks originating in the global financial markets that are transmitted to the local 
level by Italy’s weak position in that landscape (e.g. austerity measures). 
• Network interests were built into the economic model before profit (painful short-term sacrifices provide 
solidity in the long run) 
• The growth expectations are modest: growth is possible and desirable rather than mandatory (it's a marathon 
not a 100-metre run). 
• Sardex is non-partisan in terms of common political discourse, but with a clear ‘cultural project’ to develop. 
The founders had a clear project they wanted to implement with the goal of helping the region face the 
economic crisis that affected an already depressed economic context. They invented and experimented with 
a business model that was non-partisan and non-ideological, differentiating Sardex from many other 
examples, such as LETS, that are often influenced by a partisan interpretation of what a complementary 
currency should look like. 
• Finally, geography also played a role, since the fact that Sardinia is an island strengthens the Sardinian cultural 
identity. In addition, Sardinia is one of a few autonomous regions in Italy with devolved powers from the 
national government. For some of the respondents the question of autonomy, if not quite political 
independence, from the national government was an important factor for their joining and supporting the 
initiative. 
 
From a social science point of view, on the other hand, in addition to the economic and technical 
dimensions, which Sardex supports and implements very effectively, its success can be understood from 
four points of view: human, social, political, and institutional. 
 
First, as discussed in Section 2, a key factor in the success of Sardex is the specific group of people that 
decided to take on this challenge. Being at the same time friends since childhood and with 
complementary skill-sets led to a very powerful and efficient team that enjoyed absolute trust between its 
members. 
 
Second, from our sociological analysis it is evident that trust plays a key role. Although an initial level of 
trust in the founders of the circuit is essential, the operation of the circuit itself also constantly reinforces 
it. Personal trust towards people you know directly or friends of friends is fundamental to make the first 
move (as of entering a complementary commercial network) in a depressed economic context as Sardinia 
is. Then, trust is developed in a virtuous self-reinforcing loop through first hand experience. 
 
Third, it seems also crucial for the success of Sardex the fact that its members followed a pragmatic 
approach and transformed the more “suitable” organization framework for the specific context (a limited 
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liability company) to a local institution that has stayed committed toward social objectives while at the 
same time ensuring its own economic sustainability. 
 
Fourth, from an institutional perspective an interesting question is to ask whether Sardex resembles the 
role of the State in a narrow, newer, finite, regional market. The answer is affirmative: Sardex does 
resemble the state, albeit at a different scale, as a local institution and reference point to turn to for help 
and advice. Another role of the state is as regulator. In this, Sardex does not play a very strong role, but it 
does invoke the contractual agreements with its members when they do not follow the agreed rules. 
Some of the regulatory functions, however, are performed by the members themselves when, for 
example, they report “antisocial behaviour” such as charging more for a given product or service if its 
paid in credits relative to its Euro price. Thus, some regulation is achieved more simply through social 
norms. In fact, just as the state usually reflects a legitimate public interest, Sardex builds its legitimacy 
on the process: founders were (and are) able to push forward in the name of the territory while anchoring 
the economic exchange on solid networks of trust relations between firms. This is key to creating a 
‘public interest’ for the community, that is to say, a common interest that helps the community integrate 
and interact. Finally, the mutual credit networks being started in different regions on the Italian mainland 
are also loosely bound by service agreements and guidelines, amounting to a federated system based on a 
high-level template that takes slightly different forms in different regional contexts. 
 
These four features have led Sardex to serve as a building block of the local territory, helping integrate 
smaller, sparse firms into a community that is not only economic but bears social values. As for the role 
of the State, Sardex aims at building a stable market representing an alternative economic and social 
space that glues together and balances economic benefits and non-mainstream social values. 
 
A notable set of challenges for the future of Sardex lie in its relationship with the public sector and in its 
expansion to other regional networks. Collaboration with the public sector has started at the level of the 
regional government an in the form of time-delayed credits for the payment of public sector suppliers, 
through the EU project DigiPay4Growth mentioned above. The idea is that the regional government can 
pay its suppliers with type of credits that are similar to Sardex, but that “expire” after a few months, 
when the government has enough Euros, and become themselves Euros. Since all these payments take 
place electronically it is technologically feasible to set up such a system. Although not  yet operational, 
the discussion and implementation are at an advanced stage. 
 
A second area of expansion is with city governments. This idea was explained to us by a Sardex member 
from Sassari during a recent bout of interviews in February 2016 (Dini et al. 2014-16). Whereas it is not 
possible to collect taxes in Sardex at the national level, at the city level there is nothing stopping the city 
government from collecting local taxes in Sardex, and using them to pay for (part of) public services 
such as busses, rubbish collection, sport facilities, and parks. 
 
Finally, as already mentioned there is keen interest to reproduce the Sardex experience in six other Italian 
regions. Since each local context is different, each new instance of a Sardex-like mutual credit system 
will encounter different challenges, all very difficult. Sardex s.r.l. is currently offering its software 
platform to mediate on behalf of these other regional networks. It is not clear how the system will scale 
technologically as the size and number of circuits increase and institutionally as ways to trade between 
circuits are explored and implemented. 
 
 
6. CONCLUSION   
 
As discussed at various points in this paper, compared to other alternatives (such as LETS and Time 
Banks), Sardex plays a distinctive role as mediator, which reflects its founders’ specific ‘cultural’ project 
(Sartori and Dini 2016). Not only does it mediate economic exchanges between members, but it has 
become a trustworthy actor over the whole Sardinian territory. The core team of Sardex was able to 
tackle all the main dangers (e.g. decrease in enthusiasm and participation, internal organizational 
changes, scale-up) that usually lead to failure. Sardex also succeeded in creating a trusted network of 
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exchange that counterbalances the poor performance of an economically depressed region with a long-
standing tradition of low-level civicness, closed family networks, and negative social capital. Sardex also 
achieved the goal of embodying the social relations of credit and debt incorporated in money by 
engaging the two main streams of sociological literature on money. In Sardex, money’s fungibility is 
defined by market utility and social values at the same time. 
 
Compared to other mutual credit systems, like WIR, RES,7 the many systems listed by CES8 in South 
Africa, and various small-scale trade exchanges in the US, in addition to its unique design features 
Sardex is distinguished by its federated model of expansion and its strong commitment in keeping a 
balance between the economic and social aspects.  
 
In sum, Sardex is a successful original blend of economic alternatives to an actual market. It serves 
economic purposes but at the same time it is imbued with and promotes a specific vision of economic 
and social development at the local level. We conclude that the metaphor of ‘market as politics’ applies 
to Sardex because it emerges from a political process shared by economic actors in the social 
construction of a market. It solves coordination problems, opens up new markets and business 
opportunities and, at the same time, it promotes an alternative endeavour connected to trust, common 
meanings, and the sharing of resources. 
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1 WIR is short for Wirtschaftsring, German for ‘economic circle’, but also means ‘we’ in German, emphasizing the 
community and solidarity aspects of the currency. WIR is B2B and refers to the network of SMEs as well as to 
the currency itself, which is nominally held at the same value as the Swiss Franc (CHF) to simplify accounting 
(the unit of account is equal to the CHF). 
2 We conducted 29 semi-structured interviews in three waves in Summer 2015-Winter 2016 with circuit members 
following a city-campaign criterion: 1/3 of the interviews in Cagliari; ½ in smaller towns such as Serramanna 
(where the headquarters are), Assemini, Carbonia, Terralba and Oristano; and the rest in the larger town of 
Sassari. We selected a wide range of business types: professionals (lawyers, notary, professional association of 
private training instructors, translators); food and hospitality sector (supermarkets, restaurants, bars, catering); 
artisans and small manufacturing (blacksmith, decorator, plastic bags, neon signs); retail (clothes, sports, 
electronic appliances, plumbing materials, tyres, crockery and household); other services (printing, postal 
service). For the last wave, Sartori and Dini thank the insightful comments and suggestions for the interview 
script by Dr Wallis Motta, anthropologist at LSE. 
3 http://dati.istat.it/Index.aspx?QueryId=4836 
4 http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=ilc_di12 
5 There is also an important difference between Sardex and other B2B regional currency examples, in that the latter 
tend to stay small. As Thomas Greco highlighted in his interview during a visit at Sardex's headquarters (Greco 
2015a; see also Greco 2015b), ‘The reason why trade exchanges in the US have not a higher impact, have not 
reached a higher scale, is due to complacency’. More specifically, because ‘they are for-profit businesses by 
small entrepreneurial groups and they are pretty much content with the level of business that they are doing and 
the level of profit that they are making’ and because of their ‘unwillingness to risk what they have, to venture into 
something new and unknown’. By contrast, Sardex seems to be willing to take such risks. 
6 The 80m Euro of backing is only a theoretical figure since at any one time the maximum amount of money 
created is capped by the sum of all the credit lines (maximum negative balances), which are on average about 
1/10 of the maximum positive balances. The theoretically maximum monetary mass that can exist at any one 
time, if we assume this average ratio, is close to 7.2m. The average monetary mass of 4m observed towards the 
end of 2015 results from many members’ tendency not to use their entire credit line, and the 51m of transaction 
volume results from its velocity, i.e. the fact that credit money is created and spent multiple times before it is 
destroyed. In fact, 51m/4m = 12.75, which is close to the 10x velocity estimate usually quoted for Sardex credits. 
7 http://www.res.be/  
8 https://www.community-exchange.org/joinexchange.asp?country=ZA  
